You know, we do not need that much security: just to keep most occasional hackers outside
OK, but good security is not more expensive than bad security. For the same price (often cheaper, in fact, being in development effort or in devices cost) you could obtain something that will really be a long-term deterrent, even for motivated attackers.
Moreover, relying on the current state-of-the-art will allow you to actually grade your resistance level: even repelling only "most people" might prove more difficult than it looks.
Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
SHA-1 Broken: Collision Attack Found, Implications for Cryptography
NIST is issuing a tentative agenda for the development of a SHA successor
Does the proof of the Riemann hypothesis really bring the whole of ecommerce to its knees?
The Cost of Insecurity: Understanding the “Non-Loss” Benefit of Cryptography
The Cost of “Just Enough” Security: Why Good Cryptography isn’t More Expensive
Cryptographer Consulting: Security Transparency vs. Relying on Ourselves
Why do people believe they should handle cryptography themselves?
The Illusion of Simplicity: Why Designing Your Own Cryptography Fails
Why Do I Need a Cryptographer?
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Academic and Historical References
What Is Our Methodology?
Security Courses, Cryptography Consulting, System Evaluation & TTP Services
Bridging The Gap Between Scientific Research And Industry Needs